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1)0 \,DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
conducted with dignity and decorum, and that it is entirely within the
discretion of the judge to stop representatives of the press in any field of
activity which creates distractions interfering with orderly court proce-
dure. Evidence was also introduced, however, establishng the fact that
the use of cameras, radio, and television would not invariably interfere
with the proper administration of justice. In fact, evidence conclusively
proved that photographs can now be taken by the press within the court-
room with little or no detection by others present.
It follows logically from the foregoing discussion that the photograph-
ing of spectators and other persons, not in the custody of the court, on
streets and sidewalks surrounding the courthouse, is not violative of the
so near thereto concept in either a causal or a geographical sense. Nor is
it violative of the clear and present danger rule, because the photograph-
ing of spectators beyond the courtroom is an activity too remote to be
considered a clear and present danger to the proper administration of
justice. Finally, such photography is not violative of Canon 35, because
this canon concerns activities exclusively within the courtroom.
In the case under consideration, certiorari was recently denied per
curiam by the United States Supreme Court.3' Such denial, however, does
not act as a final determination of the subject, for the controversy will
endure as long as judges continue to extend their powers beyond the
courtroom to acts which do not interfere with the proper administration
of justice.
3' Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. Grimes, 29 U.S.L. WFxc 3101 (U.S. Oct.. 11, 1960)
(No. 237).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-OHIO SUPREME COURT
UPHOLDS CONVICTION UNDER STATUTE
PROHIBITING "KNOWING POSSESSION"
OF OBSCENE LITERATURE
In packing the belongings of a tenant for storage until his return, de-
fendant discovered some lewd and lascivious books and pictures. With-
out any intent to exhibit, distribute or look at them again, she placed
them in the storage box for her departed roomer's return. Armed with a
search warrant to look for policy paraphernalia, three policemen dis-
covered the obscene material in defendant's bedroom and thereupon ar-
rested her;' she was subsequently convicted for violation of an Ohio
1 The Supreme Court has held that in state prosecutions for violations of state statutes,
evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure is admissible. Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951). But see Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206 (1960). Ohio has ruled that such evidence is admissible in their courts. State
v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E. 2d 490 (1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 506 (1936).
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statute2 which prohibits the knowing possession of obscene literature. On
appeal, four of the six Ohio Supreme Court justices ruled that the statute
was unconstitutional as interfering with freedom of speech and of the
press, but since under an Ohio constitutional provision3 no law can be
held unconstitutional unless all but one of the judges concur, the convic-
tion was upheld. State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N.E. 2d 387 (1960),
appeal docketed, 29 U.S.L. WEEK 3046 (U.S. July 14, 1960) (No. 236).
Noteworthy and of extreme importance in conjunction with the in-
stant case is the recent Smith v. California4 decision. In Smith a Los
Angeles ordinance' prohibited the possession of obscene material in any
place where books are sold or kept for sale. The Supreme Court held
that the absence of scienter made the ordinance unconstitutional. The
Court reasoned that the ordinance imposed a severe limitation on the
public's access to constitutionally protected matter in that the bookseller
would be criminally liable without knowledge of the contents of the
book, and therefore he would tend to restrict the books he sold to those
which he had read. By restricting him, the public's access to reading mat-
ter would be impeded. The Court's major argument was that an ordi-
nance requiring scienter would be less likely to result in an undue re-
striction on the distribution of legitimate literature than one which did
not.6
Although the California Supreme Court in interpreting the statute in
the Smith case held that the ordinance did not prohibit possession with
intent to sell, but possession in places where literature was likely to be
sold or exhibited, 7 it would appear that the United States Supreme Court
relied wholly on the restriction of dissemination of all literature, con-
struing the statute to mean possession with intent to disseminate. The
latter conclusion is based upon the fact that the Court did not discuss
2 OHIO REv. CODE tit. 29, S 2905.34 (Supp. 1959). The statute provides: "No person
shall knowingly . . . have in his possession or under his control an obscene, lewd, or
lascivious book ... print [or] picture . ... "
3 OHIo CONsT. art. IV, § 2. This section reads in part: "No law shall be held unconsti-
tutional and void by the supreme court without the concurrence of at least all but one
of the judges, except in the aflirmance of a judgment of the court of appeals declaring
a law unconstitutional and void."
4 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
5 Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 41.01.1 (1955).
6 Black J. concurring stated: "The fact is, of course, that prison sentences for posses-
sion of 'obscene' books will seriously burden freedom of the press whether punishment
is imposed with or without knowledge of the obscenity." Id. at 156. He added that "the
result of this case is that one particular bookseller gains his freedom, but the way is left
open for state censorship and punishment of all other booksellers by merely adding a
few new words to old censorship laws." Ibid.
7 People v. Smith, 161 Cal. App. 2d 860, 327 P. 2d 636 (1958).
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.' the matter of possegsion per se. Summarizing therefore, what seems to -be
the feeling of the Supreme Court in Smith: The possession of obscene
literature is not to be interfered with unless one knowingly possesses
with intent to distribute. However, the Ohio statute in the principal case
prohibits knowing possession per se.
From the two cases these two serious questions arise concerning the
future content of obscenity statutes: (1) If the Ohio statute is considered
constitutional, what would be the possible indirect result that would
flow from it? (2) Can states cope with the problem of obscene literature
without Ohio-type statutes?
Modernly, both state legislative bodies and Congress can, as a general
rule, constitutionally dispense with scienter or mens rea as pre-requisites
to crimes mala prohibita.8 Under present penal statutes mere possession
of certain articles constitute a crime; narcotics and drugs are prime ex-
amples. The statutes prohibiting the illegal possession of a narcotic drug
do not distinguish as to whether possession of the drug was for one's own
use or for sale. The purpose of such statutes is to regulate the use of
substances or preparations that are extremely injurious to both the moral
qualities and physical structures of human beings: 9 All too often it has
been found that such use leads directly to crime and other anti-social
activities.
Strict liability is also imposed for the manufacture or sale of defective
food.10 The underlying principle of these statutes is that the public in-
terest in the purity of its food is so great that it demands the ultimate in
care from distributors; of no avail will be a plea of ignorance of the
food's quality or a plea of great care in handling and/or in processing.
Other "possession" crimes include: (1) possession of deadly weapons, 1
(2) dangerous drugs, 12 (3) counterfeit coins,' 3 (4) machine guns, 14 and
(5) "policy" paraphernalia. 15
There is no question that the state, through the use of its police power,
may enact either mere possession or possession-plus-scienter type criminal
statutes. The police power of a state in its broadest sense includes all
8 .lorissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S.
250 (1922); United States v. Greenbaum, 138 F. 2d 437 (3rd Cir. 1943); People v. Fernow,
286 I11. 627, 122 N.E. 155 (1919). But see Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957),
petition for rehearing denied, 355 U.S. 937 (1957), where the Supreme Court held that
this rule is not without limitations.
5 State v. Martin, 193 La. 1036, 192 So. 694 (1939).
10 Culbertson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 157 S. C. 352, 154 S.E. 424 (1930); Meshbesher
v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104, 119 N.W. 428 (1909).
11 E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 152 (1959).
12 Id. at § 186.43. 14 Id. at § 414 (b).
13 Id. at § 284. 1 Id. at § 414.
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legislation and almost every function of civil government, and specifical-
ly embraces regulations designed to promote public convenience or the
general prosperity or welfare, as well as those specifically intended to
promote the public safety or public health. 16
Almost all states have passed laws controlling the selling, possession,
and circulation of lewd books and pictures.' 7 Typical of such laws, with
few exceptions,' 8 is the Delaware statute:
. Whoever sells, lends, distributes, exhibits, gives away or shows, . . . or has
in his possession with intent to sell, lend, distribute, exhibit, give awav or show,
. . . any obscene ...book, magazine, pamphlet, newspaper, . . . writing,
drawing, photograph, film, figure or image, or any written or printed matter
of an indecent, obscene, ... nature ... shall be fined ...or imprisoned. .. .19
Such legislation, therefore, seeks, in the main, not to punish the possession
or reading of obscene literature, but to prohibit the traffic in such mate-
rials. This right of prohibition was upheld in Roth v. United States.20
Considered with the Roth case was the companion case of Alberts v.
California.2" Roth was convicted of sending obscene materials through
the mails, and Alberts of keeping for sale obscene material. The Court
held that sex and obscenity are not synonymous, and that obscenity is
not within the area of constitutionally protected speech.
Whereas many convictions22 have been obtained under statutes similar
to that of the Delaware statute stated above, few cases have been decided
directly concerning possession per se 23 and no case has been found where
16 Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915).
'7 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE 9 311; CONN. GEN. STAT. ch. 945. 53-243 (Supp. 1959); DEL.
CODE ANN. ch. 3, tit. 11, 5 711 (Supp. 1958); GA. CODE ANN. S 26-6301 (Supp. 1959);
IOWA CODE ANN. ch. 725, §§ 725.4-.5 (Supp. 1959); KN. GEN. STAT. ch. 21, art II, § 21-
1102 (Supp. 1951); MASS. ANN.LAWS ch. 272, §§ 28 (A)-(B) (Supp. 1959);MINN. STAT.
ANN. ch. 617, § 617.24 (Supp. 1959); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 563, § 563.270 (Supp.
1960); NEV. REV. STAT. ch. 201, tit. 16, 5 201.250 (1955); N.Y. PENAL CODE § 1141; PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, S 4524 (Supp. 1959); TEX. PENAL CODE ch. 7, tit. 10, arts. 526-7 (Supp.
1960); W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 8, S 6066 (Supp. 1960).
18 IND. STAT. ANN. ch. 28, § 10-2803 (Supp. 1960); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 468 (1959);
ME. REV. STAT. ch. 134, § 24 (Supp. 1959); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 847, §847.01 (Supp.
1959); W Yo. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 9, art. 5, S 9-513 (Supp. 1953); Wis. STAT. ANN.
ch. 944, tit. 45, S 944.22 (Supp. 1959); OHIo REV. CODE tit. 29, § 2905.34 (Supp. 1959).
These statutes are different in that possession, with or without any intent, constitutes
a crime.
1 9 DEL. CODE ANN. ch. 3, tit. 11, S 711 (Supp. 1958). (Emphasis added.)
20354 U.S. 476 (1957).
21 Ibid.
22 State v. Hochman, 2 Wis. 2d 410, 86 N.W. 2d 446 (1957); Commonwealth v. Blu-
inenstein, 184 Pa. Super 83, 133 A. 2d 865 (1957); State v. Kohler, 40 N.J. Super. 600,
123 A. 2d 881 (1956); Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E. 2d 840 (1945).
23 City of Cincinnati v. King, 107 Ohio App. 453, 159 N.E. 2d 767 (1958); People v.
Edelman, 320 IM. App. 361, 51 N.E. 2d 76 (1943).
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a court of last resort has rendered a decision concerning the point of th
principal case-i.e., mere knowing possession of obscene literature. How
ever, in State v. Kowan,24 a recent Ohio appellate case, the knowing pos
session of obscene literature was one of the issues. The court stated il
the Kowan decision that "society has a right and the necessity of pro,
tecting itself from the prurient interests of any individual aroused b)
obscene literature. '2 5 The court added: "The danger to the communit)
as a whole is just as great whether the possessor holds the obscene litera-
ture solely for his own purposes as it is when he exhibits or sells it to
others." 26
The court in Kowan, as well as the framers of the ordinance which was
struck down in Smith, focused attention solely toward the elimination of
smut, but indirect results cannot be overlooked, as was pointed out in the
Smith decision and others. For example, in Near v. Minnesota,27 defend-
ant was found guilty under a statute which provided that anyone en-
gaged in publishing a malicious and scandalous newspaper would be
guilty of a nuisance; furthermore, a permanent injunction could be ob-
tained restricting those committing the nuisance from further committing
or maintaining it. The Near Court recognized the state's authority to pro-
tect its citizens by appropriate legislation; however, the Court declared
the particular statute unconstitutional in that it not only suppressed the
offending newspaper, but in application put the publisher under effective
censorship. Thus the Court found the statute unconstitutional in applica-
tion. In the Mapp case, it would seem that the same criterion should be
followed, i.e., "Is the Ohio statute unconstitutional in application?" But
looking at the other side of the coin for a moment, if the Ohio statute
were declared constitutional, what would be some possible results there-
of? The following hypothetical situations are offered as examples:
(1) A bookseller receives in his shop a book which because of its
price, sex blurbs on its back, and its few pages is suspected of being ob-
scene. 2s He removes it immediately from stock, reads it at home and
finds it utterly obscene. Under the Ohio-type statute, he is guilty.
(2) X decides to purchase some additions to his home library. Under
the statute, it is incumbent upon X to determine through a preliminary
24 156 N.E. 2d 170 (Ohio C.P. 1958).
25 Id. at 172.
26 Ibid.
27 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
28 Though the Supreme Court in Smith laid down no tests for scienter, a recent New
York case, People v. Schenkman, 195 N.Y.S. 2d 570 (Spec. Sess. 1960), held that where
the bookseller received a book with few pages, yet with a high price and with sex
blurbs on the back, the requirement of scienter was met.
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examination at the bookstore whether or not the book is obscene. If
through his quick scanning of the book, he determines that it is not ob-
scene, but when he reads it at home discovers that it is obscene, he is
guilty of violating the statute.
On the other hand, the states obviously believe that there is a causal
relationship between obscene material and antisocial behavior.29 But the
question then is: "Should the reader be subject to prosecution if he un-
knowingly purchases obscene literature?" States must have obscenity
statutes, but the watch word must be reasonableness. Reasonableness here
should be the coupling of knowing possession with some intent, and in
the appeal of State v. Mapp30 presently pending before the United States
Supreme Court, it is believed that the Court will recognize the latter fact
and declare the Ohio statute unconstitutional.
29 For an excellent criticism of the view that there is no causal relationship between
obscene literature and anti-social activities, see Schmidt, A Justification of Statutes Bar-
ring Pornography fron the Mail, 26 FORDHAM L. REv. 70 (1957).
30 29 U.S.L. VEEK 3046 (U.S. July 14, 1960) (No. 236).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE STATUTE PROHIBITING
COLLECTION OF DUES IF UNION OFFICER CONVICTED
OF FELONY, HELD CONSTITUTIONAL
A New York statute, the New York Waterfront Commission Act of
1953, section 8,1 prohibited the collection of dues on behalf of any
waterfront labor organization if any officer or agent of such organization
had been convicted of a felony and had not been pardoned or given a
certificate of good conduct from a board of parole. Defendant, District
Attorney of Richmond County, threatened to prosecute anyone collect-
ing dues for Local 1346 of the International Longshoremen's Association,
because its Secretary-Treasurer, the plaintiff, had pleaded guilty to a
charge of grand larceny in 1920 and had received a suspended sentence.
By reason of this threat, plaintiff was suspended as an officer of Local
1346. An action for a declaratory judgment was thereupon instituted,
plaintiff claiming section 8 to be in conflict with the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution, and the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. It was further alleged that section 8 constituted a
bill of attainder and was an ex post facto law. The Supreme Court of
the United States, by a five to three decision (Mr. Justice Harlan took
no part in the consideration or decision of the case), affirmed the lower
courts and upheld the validity of the Waterfront Commission Act, stating
I N.Y. UN coNSOL. LAWS § 6700 (McKinney Supp. 1960).
